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Our hypothetical frames the issue of client perjury in a way that is both
topical and troubling given the role informants have played in wrongful
convictions. In the following comments I juxtapose the lawyer's response to the
perjury in our hypothetical scenario, which for convenience I refer to as a
"cooperating witness scenario," with perjury from a client who proposes to testify
at her own trial, which I refer to as a "classic scenario." To be clear, in a
cooperating witness scenario the perjurious client proposes to testify for the
government at a criminal trial at which the client is not a defendant. In a classic
scenario, by contrast, the perjurious client proposes to testify for the defense at a
criminal trial in which she is a defendant. Use of the word "classic" here reflects
no empirical assessment of the relative frequency of this scenario. Rather, use of
the label "classic" is based on my estimation that readers are more likely familiar
with this scenario than the one posed in our hypothetical since the classic scenario
has been the focal point of much commentary, the leading Supreme Court case on
client perjury,1 and a scene from a famous film frequently used in discussing client
perjury.2
A lawyer's obligations in dealing with perjury have most frequently been
analyzed and discussed in the context of the classic scenario. There has been
considerable debate about, and commentators, courts, and ethics authorities have
staked out a variety of competing positions on, the appropriate ethical course of
action for a lawyer in this situation.3 Courts and commentators have also
addressed perjury with some frequency in the context of a prosecutor calling a
witness to testify at trial. Here there has been little debate or variation in positions.
Prosecutors are uniformly viewed as having a constitutional and ethical obligation
to avoid the use of perjured testimony. One of the things I find interesting about
the cooperating witness scenario posed in our hypothetical is that it presents a
blend of features from the classic scenario and the scenario of a prosecutor dealing
with witness perjury. As in the classic scenario, defense counsel in our
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1 The case is Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
2 The scene, from ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959), features Jimmy
Stewart as a lawyer discussing with a client his potential testimony at his upcoming murder trial.
3 See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, Ch. 6: The Perjury Trilemma, in
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcs 159-94 (3d. ed. 2004) (reviewing various positions and
arguments that have been advanced over the past forty years about the lawyer's obligations regarding
client perjury).
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hypothetical is the focal point of the ethics analysis, the source of the perjury is the
defense lawyer's client, and the client is charged with a crime. But, as in the
prosecutorial scenario, the perjury here is intended to be offered by the prosecutor
and will be offered to support conviction rather than acquittal.
I. THE RISK OF ERROR
One key difference between the cooperating witness scenario and the classic
scenario is that the perjury in the cooperating witness scenario is inculpatory, while
the perjury in the classic scenario is exculpatory. Accordingly, each creates risk of
a different type of error. In the classic scenario, false exculpatory testimony
increases the risk of an erroneous acquittal. In the cooperating witness scenario,
false inculpatory testimony increases the risk of an erroneous conviction.
As reflected most clearly in our use of the "beyond reasonable doubt"
standard of proof in criminal trials, we do not and should not view an erroneous
conviction and an erroneous acquittal as equal in significance. Rather, conviction
of an innocent person is a much more serious error than acquittal of a guilty
person, a judgment that DNA exonerations throughout the country have
dramatically illustrated and reinforced. The fact that the perjury in our
hypothetical creates a risk of wrongful conviction rather than wrongful acquittal
makes the case for the defense lawyer adopting a regulatory 4 approach toward his
client's perjury, entailing remedial action by the lawyer, significantly stronger in
our hypothetical than in the classic scenario.
II. THE CLIENT'S INTERESTS
The client's interests that might be compromised by the lawyer taking a
regulatory stance also differ significantly in the cooperating witness and classic
scenarios. In the classic scenario, the client is on trial in a criminal case, a position
4 I use the term "regulatory" here as it is used by William H. Simon in Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1988).
[The regulatory approach's] basic maxim is that the lawyer should facilitate informed
resolution of the substantive issues by the responsible officials .... It sees the lawyer's
basic function as contributing to the enforcement of the substantive law, and it inclines
toward forbidding her to use procedural rules in ways that frustrate the enforcement of
substantive norms. The most important way it does so is by giving the lawyer strong
responsibilities as a distiller and transmitter of information. Her basic duty is to clarify
the issues in ways that contribute to a decision on the merits, not to manipulate
information to serve the client's goals. The job still involves advising the client on ways
to advance her interests and presenting the client's case, but it also involves a duty to
develop and disclose adverse information that would be important to the responsible
official .... It refuses to exempt the lawyer from responsibility for circumstances that
impede enforcement merely because her conduct has not affirmatively contributed to
them. In particular, it imposes affirmative duties to share information and to correct
misunderstanding.
Id. at 1085-86 (emphasis added).
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in which our laws and legal ethics rules view a client as both needing and
deserving the greatest degree of protection. Her liberty and, in a capital case, her
life are at stake. The client is a direct adversary of the government, with its
substantial powers and resources. The defense lawyer here acts as a shield to
protect against injustice resulting from the asymmetry in power and resources
between the government and an individual citizen inherent in criminal cases. The
constellation of constitutional and statutory rights we recognize on behalf of a
defendant in a criminal trial reflects our assessment that the weight of the client's
interests in this scenario is great. Accordingly, in this setting we should have great
concern about a regulatory role for defense counsel compromising his client's
interests.
The defense lawyer in the cooperating witness scenario, by contrast, operates
in a negotiation rather than a trial setting. The client's interest here is in entering a
contractual relationship with the government to exchange truthful cooperation and
testimony for a reduction in sentence.5 Instead of seeking protection from the
state, the client in our hypothetical seeks the government's favor. Rather than
offsetting an asymmetry in resources between the government and an individual
defendant, the lawyer and his client seek to augment the informational and
evidentiary resources of the prosecution.
The client's interest in cooperating and reducing her sentence is legitimate,
one that her lawyer is, and should be, ethically bound to advance. We as a society
do and should encourage criminals to cooperate, a view reflected in prosecutorial
bargaining and judicial sentencing practices throughout the United States. But a
client's interest in obtaining a sentence reduction in return for cooperation does not
and should not carry the same weight as the interests of a client on trial in a
criminal case. This lesser weight is reflected in the fact that we recognize no
constitutional or statutory right to such a contractual exchange. The prosecutor is
free to accept or reject such an offer of cooperation.
The fact that the client's interest in seeking a sentence reduction is of lesser
weight than the interests of a client who is a defendant at a criminal trial makes the
argument for the defense lawyer adopting a regulatory stance regarding his client's
perjury stronger in our hypothetical than in the classic scenario.
5 For an example of an opinion that views a guilty plea agreement through the lens of
contract law, see United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997).
If the court accepts the agreement and thus the Government's promised performance,
then the contemplated agreement is complete and the defendant gets the benefit of his
bargain. But if the court rejects the Government's promised performance, then the
agreement is terminated and the defendant has the right to back out of his promised
performance (the guilty plea), just as a binding contractual duty may be extinguished by
the nonoccurrence of a condition subsequent.
Id. at 677-78 (citing JOHN D. CALAMARl & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-7 (3d ed.
1987); 3A ARTHuR A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 628 (1960)).
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III. AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM ARGUMENT
One may frame the debate over the appropriate response for a lawyer dealing
with client perjury as a choice between regulatory and libertarian 6 models of
lawyer behavior. What might a proponent of the libertarian model argue in regard
to the cooperating witness scenario?
Against the defense lawyer adopting a regulatory stance and in favor of a
libertarian approach one might argue that the regulatory approach is inconsistent
with the duty of confidentiality and may decrease the amount and quality of
information the client shares with her lawyer. This loss of information in turn may
decrease the lawyer's effectiveness and deprive him of the opportunity to dissuade
the client from committing perjury. Is this risk of decreased effectiveness and loss
of the opportunity to dissuade worth taking if other actors in our adversarial
criminal justice system handle the task of detecting and defusing the cooperating
client's perjury?
During the evidentiary phase of a trial, opposing counsel works to check
witness perjury through cross-examination and various techniques of extrinsic
impeachment. In a cooperating witness scenario, opposing counsel will use the
plea agreement to challenge the cooperating client's testimony on grounds of bias.
He will also challenge the client's credibility using any prior crimes, dishonest
acts, and prior inconsistent statements. The opposing lawyer also typically draws
the jury's attention to testimonial weaknesses during closing argument. Jurors are
the final arbiters of witness credibility in our trial system, assigned primary
responsibility for identifying and ignoring perjury. In the classic scenario, with
both the prosecutor (as opposing counsel) and jurors assigned the task of guarding
against perjury by a criminal defendant, one can argue it is redundant to assign this
task as well to defense counsel.
This sort of "adversary system argument" is stronger in the cooperating
witness scenario than it is in the classic scenario. In the cooperating witness
scenario, in addition to opposing counsel (the lawyer representing Kingpin, the
defendant against whom the client will testify) and jurors, there is another actor
who can detect and defuse potential perjury-the prosecutor who decides whether
or not to call the cooperating client as a witness. The prosecutor has a
constitutional and ethical obligation to avoid the knowing introduction of perjury.
She also has a strategic interest in avoiding the use of perjury. The Model Rules
6 Again I intend to use the term "libertarian" here as it is used by William H. Simon, supra
note 4.
[The libertarian approach's] basic maxim is that the lawyer is obliged--or at least
authorized-to pursue any goal of the client through any arguably legal course of action
and to assert any nonfrivolous legal claim. In this approach, the only ethical duty
distinctive to the lawyer's role is loyalty to the client. Legal ethics impose no direct
responsibilities to third parties or the public other than those the system imposes on
citizens generally.
Id. at 1085.
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give her discretion not to introduce testimony suspected to be false. Thus, the
prosecutor may screen out the cooperating client's perjury by refusing the offer of
cooperation and not calling the client as a witness. In sum, while there are two
potential intervening actors--opposing counsel and the jury-who will evaluate
the client's testimony and may thwart the client's perjury in the classic scenario,
there are three such actors in our hypothetical-the prosecutor, defense counsel for
Kingpin, and the jury. For this reason, an adversary system argument against
requiring the defense lawyer to adopt a regulatory role is stronger, at least on a
theoretical level, than an adversary system argument against requiring the defense
lawyer to adopt a regulatory stance in the classic scenario.
In light of what DNA exonerations have revealed in recent years about the
sources of wrongful convictions, such a theoretical adversary system argument is
likely to prompt an empirical response. Although a number of participants in our
adversary system are responsible for detecting perjury in a cooperating witness
scenario, DNA exonerations and subsequent investigations have shown that those
participants have failed to prevent informant perjury from corrupting verdicts in a
shocking number of cases. False testimony from cooperating witnesses seeking
reduced prison sentences, such as the client in our hypothetical, has repeatedly
been identified as contributing to wrongful convictions, suggesting that
prosecutors and police have failed to detect such perjury, defense counsel have
failed to expose such perjury through cross-examination and other impeachment
techniques, and jurors have failed to identify and ignore such perjury.
IV. WHAT SHOULD THE ETHICS RULES ALLOW AND REQUIRE OUR LAWYER TO DO?
Of the competing arguments reviewed above, I find most persuasive the ones
in favor of a regulatory approach for defense counsel in our hypothetical scenario.
In particular, the fact that the testimony is intended to support conviction rather
than acquittal convinces me that the defense lawyer's ethical obligations in the
cooperating witness scenario should be seen as more analogous to the obligations
of a prosecutor dealing with witness perjury than the obligations of a defense
lawyer dealing with client perjury in the classic scenario.
So what, in my view, should the ethics rules allow and require the lawyer to
do? They should require him first to try to dissuade his client from offering the
perjury as part of a plea agreement by emphasizing that such perjury is immoral,
illegal, and against the client's self-interest. The potential negative impact on the
client of being caught committing perjury, or even suspected of having committed
perjury by either the prosecutor or the judge who eventually sentences the client, is
substantial. Perjury is a crime. Making false statements to the prosecutor and the
police officers likely to interview the client to assess her viability as a witness may
7 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) ("A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence,
other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is
false.").
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also be a criminal offense.8 Even if the client were neither charged nor convicted
of perjury or making false statements to a government official, the commission of
such crimes or even strong suspicion of commission of such crimes could easily
prompt the prosecutor to retract the plea agreement along with its benefits and
move both the prosecutor and the sentencing judge to adopt a more punitive
posture toward the client at sentencing. In short, the client's perjured testimony
scheme may well result in a lengthier rather than a shorter sentence.
Our hypothetical suggests the cooperating client is unable to provide much if
anything in the way of corroboration of her testimony. If so, a competent defense
lawyer should stand a strong chance of dissuading the client from offering the
perjured testimony as part of a guilty plea offer. If the lawyer fails in dissuading
the client on grounds of immorality, illegality, and self-interest, the ethics rules
should allow him then to threaten to reveal the client's perjury to the prosecutor as
a last resort in his dissuasion effort.
If the client insists on making the offer of perjured testimony, the lawyer
should be allowed to reveal the perjury to the prosecutor, but given discretion
about when to make that revelation. The prosecutor and police may find the client
unconvincing and unlikely to be an effective witness at trial, especially if there is
little or no corroboration of her testimony. For these reasons, the prosecutor may
decide not to enter a cooperation agreement with the client. If that happens,
revelation of the intended perjury would be unnecessary.
If the prosecutor, though, decides to enter the cooperation agreement and call
the client as a witness, the ethics rules should require the lawyer to "take remedial
measures," including revelation if that is the only route available to defuse the
perjury.
8 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2010) ("whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully... makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation... shall
be fined... [or] imprisoned not more than 5 years... or both."); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S.
475, 477 (1984) ("[tlhe statutory language [of 18 U.S.C. § 1001] clearly encompasses criminal
investigations conducted by the FBI and the Secret Service, and nothing in the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended a more restricted reach for the statute.").
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